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merical growth of chains regardless of their increase in capital or income is a permissible
policy of taxation. Cf. American Refining Co. v. Louisiana,179 U.S. 89 (igoo); Watson
v. State Comptroller of the State of New York, 254 U.S. 122 (1920); Roberts & Schaeffer
Co. v. Emerson, 271 U.S. 5o (1926); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. of Miss., 286 U.S. 276
(1932). The Indiana court appears to have taken this view, saying "chains are chains"
and therefore gasoline stations may be included in a chain store classification. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax. Comm. 187 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1933).
Since gasoline filling stations are subject to excise and other taxes a chain store
license tax expressly exempting them is constitutional. Liggett Co. v. Lee 288 U.S. 517
(1933); Southern Grocery Stores v. S.C. Tax Comm., 55 F. (2d) 931 (E.D.S.C. 1932);
GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N.C. 433, 154 S.E. 838 (193o); J. C.
Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784 (Idaho 1934). But see Winter v. Barrett,352
Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933) (holding unconstitutional an occupational tax which
exempted gas stations); see 89 A. L. R. 1432 (1934). In absence of express exclusion
it has been held that these distinctions should cause gas stations not to be considered
"stores" within the act. Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 210 Wis. 448, 245 N.W. 646 (1932).
See note, 43 Yale L. J. 1022 (I934); cf. McKenney v. City Council of Alexandria,
147 Va. 157, 136 S.E. 588 (1927) (holding that a gasoline station is not within the scope
of a tax on "all engaged in business of merchants"). However, the Indiana statute held
constitutional in the Jackson case though not specifically mentioning gas stations, was
construed to include them as "stores." Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of
Tax Comm., 187 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1933); see Zimmerman, The Challenge of the Chain
Store Distribution (3931) 52; cf. Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co., 277 Pa. 289, 121 At.53 (1923) (holding that a filling station is within the purview of a covenant against
store buildings). The further fact that the West Virginia Legislature rejected a provision excluding gas stations when the act was proposed may have influenced the court
in the principal case.
The severity of the tax in the principal case and the existence of doubt as to including gasoline stations within the construction of "stores" under the act may indicate
that the Supreme Court will go far to sustain the constitutionality and extensive application of chain store legislation in the future.
Corporations-Interested Director Voting for Salary of Officer-[Illinois].-The
board of directors of a corporation, pursuant to its by-laws, by resolution had fixed
the salaries of its officers, including that of the plaintiff, the president, who was also a
director. Subsequently the plaintiff and other officers informally agreed to accept reduced salaries. The corporation having paid salaries at the reduced rate, plaintiff
sought to recover the difference between the salary paid him and the salary as fixed by
the board. Held, the record not disclosing what directors had voted for the resolution,
plaintiff could not recover without showing either that he had not voted for it or that
his vote was unnecessary for its passage. Moreover the agreement among the officers
being for the benefit of the corporation, it could use it as a defense to plaintiff's claim.
Connors v. Swords Co., 276 Ill. App. 318 (1934).
A director, being a fiduciary to his corporation, is disqualified from voting on any
matter in which he is interested; any transaction in which he is interested is voidable
whether or not the transaction is fair, if authorized or ratified only by including his
vote. Consumers' Ice & Coal Co. v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 17o Ark. 530, 28o S.W.
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677 (1926); Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 9i N.E. 1o56 (i9io); Parsons v. Tacoma
Smelting Co., 25 Wash. 492, 65 Pac. 765 (igoi); Fletcher, Cycopledia of the Law of
Corporations (Perm. ed. i931), § 936; but see Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143
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The same is true if the presence of the interested director

is necessary for a quorum. Curtin v. Salmon River Hydraulic Gold Mining and Ditch
Co., 130 Cal. 345, 62 Pac. 552 (I9oo); FederalLife InsuranceCo. v. Griffin, 173 Il. App.
5 (1912). But if the vote of the interested director was unnecessary, the resolution
being passed by an independent majority of the board, the transaction is voidable only
if unfair. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Carson, i51 Ill. 444, 38 N.E.
14o (1894); Congress Hotel Co. v. Southgate, 209 Ill. App. 442 (i918); Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (Perm. ed. i93I), § 981. Applying this principle of
the fiduciary relation of the director to his corporation it has been held that resolutions
fixing salaries are voidable if the vote of the recipient was necessary to its passage or
his presence to a quorum. Davisv. Pearce, 30 F. (2d) 85 (C.C.A. 8th 1928); Voorhees v.
Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 91 N.E. io56 (19io). Such action of the directors may be ratified
by the shareholders; and in the absence of fraud or unfairness the votes of the interested directors as stockholders may be counted, it being said that a stockholder is
not a fiduciary to his corporation. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, x3o Me. 352, 156 At.
293 (i93i); Russell v. Peterson, 232 Pa. 113, 8i Adt. 136 (i91i); Lowman v. Harvey
Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 12o Adt. 404 (1923); but see Wickersham v. Crittenden, iio Cal.
332, 42 Pac. 893 (1895); McNidta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 IMl. 427, 45 N.E. 954 (1896).
But if there were adopted separate salary resolutions for each office on which the interested director did not vote, under the usual rule the act would seem not voidable,
McNab v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co. 62 Hun x8, 16 N.Y.S. 448 (i891). If this is the
case, it would seem unfortunate to make the voidability of the resolution turn on a
matter of form, and in at least one case it has been held that a joint salary resolution
will be separated into parts, each of which is carried by a majority of disinterested
directors. Funsten v. Funsten Commission Co., 67 Mo. App. 559 (1896); contra,Beha v.
Martin, 16i Ky. 838, 171 S.W. 393 (1914). But the separate resolution theory does not
always afford a solution. Thus, for example, in a corporation with four directors, two
husbands and their wives, since husband and wife can be disqualified from voting for
each other's salary, it would be impossible even under separate resolutions for the directors to fix their salaries as officers. See Butler Paper Co. v. Robbins, 151 IIl. 588, 38
N.E. 153 (1894); StandardFurniture Co. v. Hotel Butler Co., 161 Wash. 109, 296 Pac.
153 (i93I); but see Cuneo v. Giannini,40 Cal. App. 348, 18o Pac. 633 (1919). Moreover, since the interested directors may vote as stockholders in ratifying their action
as directors, it does not seem too extreme to set aside such a resolution only if there is
fraud or bad faith on the part of the directors. Gordon Development Co. v. Warren
Ranch, 35 Ariz. 254, 276 Pac. 839 (1929); Green v. Felton, 42 Ind. App. 675, 84 N.E. 166
(igo8); Neff v. Twentieth Century Silk Corp., 312 Pa. 386, 167 Aft. 578 (1933); cf.
Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C.C.A. 4 th 1916).
A salary resolution passed by directors and accepted by an officer is a contract between the corporation and the officer subject to the ordinary rules of contracts. Alabana Lime & Stone Co. v. Adams, 218 Ala. 647, 119 So. 853 (1928); Sears v. Kings County levated Ry Co., 152 Mass. I51, 25 N.E. 98 (189o). Ordinarily one seeking to impeach a contract because of fraud or other inequitable conduct must affirmatively
prove the facts on which he relies. Bailey v. Lisle Mfg. Co., 238 Fed. 257 (C.C.A. 8th
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1936). Moreover, the acts of directors are generally presumed to be regular and in
good faith until it is shown they are not. Borg v. InternationalSilver Co., ii F. (2d)
147 (C.C.A. 2d 1925); Robinson v. PittsburghOil Refining Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126
Adt. 46 (1924); Mayger v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 68 Mont. 492, 219 Pac.
1102 (1923).

If the decision in the principal case is to be justified at all, it must be either on the
ground that the officers in agreeing between themselves to accept a reduction of salary,
made a contract on behalf of the corporation which the corporation accepted; Snow v.
Griesheirner,220 Ill. io6, 77 N.E. iio (19o6); Jones 8" Dommersnas Co. v. Crary, 234
Ill. 26, 84 N.E. 651 (19o8); or that the corporation was the third party beneficiary of
a contract between the officers. Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178 In. 122, 52 N.E. 945 (1899).
Corporations-Liability of Holding Company Shareholders for Statutory Assessment on Insolvent Subsidiary Bank Stock-[Federal].-The Detroit Bankers Company, a holding company, was organized to hold the shares of a national bank and
several state banks. In order to centralize control the voting non-par shares were
issued to the officers of the various banks for cash. The remaining shares, which were
non-voting for five years, were issued to the stockholders of various banks in exchange
for their stock. The charter provided: "The holders of stock of this corporation shall
be individually and severally liable (in proportion to the number of shares held by them
respectively) for any statutory liability imposed on this corporation by reason of ownership of shares of capital stock of any bank .... and the stockholders .... severally
agree that such liability shall be enforced in the same manner as statutory liability
may now or hereafter be enforceable against stockholders of banks under the laws of
the United States or the State of Michigan." The only assets of the holding company
were these bank stocks, so that upon failure of the subsidiary banks, the holding company became insolvent. A suit was brought to enjoin the receiver of the national bank
from enforcing the statutory liability against the stockholders of the holding company.
Held, the stockholders must pay the assessment directly to the national bank receiver.
Barbour v. Thomas, 7 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Mich. 1933).
The court in the principal case relied on the contractual relation created by the
charter provision. Therein, the stockholders of the holding company assumed a liability for the benefit of the creditors of the subsidiary banks as third party beneficiaries.
By allowing the receiver of the subsidiary bank to recover directly from the holding
company stockholders, the needless expense and delay of collection by the holding
company receiver was avoided, and the full benefit of the assessment was given to
those whom the statute intended to protect.
The court, however, suggested that the same result would have been reached by a
disregard of the corporate entity of the holding company had there been no provision
for stockholders' liability in the holding company charter and stock certificates. The
statement is often made that where an attempt has been made to evade a statute by
means of incorporation, the corporate fiction will be disregarded. U.S. v. Lehigh Valley
Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 257 (1911); I Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations
(perm. ed. 1931), § 45; Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems (1929), 4o, 63. This generalization, however, gives no criteria for determining whether an evasion has been attempted in a particular case. It has been
held that the creation of a "family" corporation to hold bank stock would not permit

